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Abstract 
 
Many scholars have interpreted the Russian government’s attack on the private oil 
companies, as in the most famous Yukos Crisis, as a legitimate battle against corruption. 
However, in the transition economies, the state can abuse its power by acting like a 
monopoly and not letting any competitive firms to operate. It can easily do so, by 
disguising its aim of retaining its monopoly power as a “fight with corruption”. In this 
paper we build a game between the state firm (government) and the private firm 
(oligarchs), where the oligarchs can be of “strong” or “weak” type. Oligarchs use the 
amount of bribe to signal their type, and try to influence the government’s decision of 
whether confiscating the private firm by accusing it of being corrupt, versus letting her 
operate and collecting bribe. 
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This paper is in the stage of proposing the game, and therefore could not address to strong results or 
conclusions yet. Comments and suggestions are most welcome. 
I. Introduction 
 
Many scholars have interpreted the Russian government’s attack on the private oil 
companies, as in the most famous Yukos Crisis, as a legitimate battle against corruption. 
However, in the transition economies, the state can abuse its power by acting like a 
monopoly and not letting any competitive firms to operate. It can easily do so, by 
disguising its aim of retaining its monopoly power as a “fight with corruption”. 
The issue of privatization, corruption and the difficulties faced by transition 
economies received the most attention for years. A broad literature has been accumulated 
on corruption and the transition process from centrally planned economies to capitalism 
since 90s. But the emphasis of the institutional deficiencies of the post-Soviet economies 
is relatively new in economic literature. Knowledge of this literature might shed light to a 
better understanding of the economic and political environment in the post-Soviet Russia 
that gave rise to corruption and crime, and furthermore, a solution plan could be 
suggested.  
Building market-enhancing institutions during the adaptation period to market 
economy is crucial. A successful transition to market economy was only a dream in the 
case of Russia. The underlying institutions were not ready to carry on market economy. 
Those institutions can be political (formal constitution and a strong democratic structure), 
legal (respect for the rule of law), economic (concept of private property, stock 
ownership, and property rights), and social institutions (development of labor market). 
This paper reviews the existing literature on transition economies, rent seeking and 
corruption; and then tries to explain the interactions between the government and the 
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businessmen (oligarchs) viewed as game, inspired by the Russian government’s fight 
with corruption. In the transition economy, since the government can still exercise a 
substantial degree of arbitrary decision making, we are assuming that the government can 
decide to allow a private company to exist, in receipt of an adequate amount of bribe; or 
shut it down by accusing it of corruption.  On the other hand, the new market economy 
needs loans from the international organizations in order to undertake investments. The 
international institutions give the loans on the basis of the country’s credibility; i.e. ‘not 
being corrupt’, following the principles of free market economy, privatizing a reasonable 
amount of state owned facilities…etc. In making the decision of letting or not letting the 
private firm to operate, the government is calculating the emergence of a potential “rival” 
versus the risk of losing its ‘credibility’ in the international community. 
The following section gives some background on the Russian oil production, the 
period of transition from communism to market economy, corruption in Russia after the 
breakup, some surveys done in the subject matter, the creation of the so called 
“oligarchs” or mafia. Section III discusses the relevant literature on rent seeking and 
corruption, with the aim of describing the place of the current paper in the literature. 
Section IV presents the model. 
 
II. Background 
 
Russian Oil 
Until 1991, the Soviet Union was the world's largest oil exporter. Soviet oil 
production and exports declined in the 1980's, and especially in the aftermath of the 
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breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
restructured its oil industry. Emergence of vertically integrated, private oil companies 
helped the country's oil production and exports to rise again. Russia is now the world's 
second largest oil exporter, behind only Saudi Arabia. Crude oil exports are a key source 
of income for Russia, as revenues from exports provide approximately 25% of the 
Russian government's income. (Source: http://www.russianoil.ru) 
Most of Russian oil is exported via terminals in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. 
However, with the increased production of the Russian oil producers there has been 
environmental concerns and hence the need for alternative export routes.  
Also, two other problems facing the Russian oil producers have been the 
restriction on exporting 30% of their production by a long-standing quota arrangement; 
and the discrepancy between export and domestic prices (Russian prices are typically just 
over half of the world market price). These problems altogether make increased sales 
abroad more and more difficult. 
Transneft (Russia’s state pipeline monopoly) maintains an exclusive control on 
exports. This has led the oil producers to attempt to challenge Transneft’s monopoly 
position on export pipelines by developing pipeline projects of their own. The oil 
companies seek alliances with Western companies in an effort to open up new export 
routes to China and elsewhere. Yukos, one of the largest oil companies in Russia, is 
negotiating with the Chinese government to build an oil pipeline to China. A deepwater 
oil terminal at Murmansk that would enable Russian oil exporters to ship their oil to the 
United States also has been proposed. Huge investments in infrastructure will be needed 
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to bring these pipelines and terminals online. Yukos has been accused by corruption 
claims, and its main production unit Yugansk has been sold to state-run oil company 
Rosneft. 
Period of Transition 
 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy has 
demonstrated some similar characteristics across Eastern European countries and Russia. 
Among these, a substantial share of shadow economy (unreported incomes, revenues); 
excessive intervention in the economy by the ruling authorities; weak financial system; 
low wages paid to the civil servants; and lack of legal protection can be mentioned as 
significant. 
There is undeniable fact of corruption in all of these transition economies. One 
other point of view to note is that corruption served as a ‘lubricant’ that facilitated the 
transition to the new economic system. 
The Western policies to help the transition of Russia totally disregarded the 
institutional aspects of the reform. What mainly steered corruption in 1990s was the 
government’s starvation for cash. The burden of debts of Soviet era, which had climbed 
up to $50 billion, fell on the new government after 1991. The loans from IMF and World 
Bank, which were supposed to ease the problem, only worsened the problem. The loans 
were ineffective largely because of the rapid-transition policy, and the subsequent panic 
in the economy. IMF and World Bank had two choices to restore Russia’s disturbed 
economy: One choice was the immediate transition to capitalism, with both economic 
and political aspects. This prescribed sudden privatization of all the assets. The second 
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option would be giving Russia enough time to slowly adjust to the market economy, and 
allow it to make gradual changes in its structure. West chose the first option. 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) in their paper “Transition to a Market 
Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform”, give the portrait of transition economies, which are 
characterized by “partial economic reforms”. In a partial reform, the government still 
controls the output and price decisions of the firms, but gives them a limited freedom as 
to what to produce or to whom to sell their output. They give the example of the 1988 
reforms in Russia, and note that by mid-1991 partial economic reform had clearly failed. 
They show that such a reform can result in a movement of some resources to private 
sector and shortages in the state sector; thus causing an overall decline in total output in 
the end. Their main argument is that the reform should be of the form “big-bang” with 
radical liberalization of all prices. And in contrast to the Russian case, they note, the 
Chinese government had kept quota restrictions to prevent the resource diversion 
problem. 
 
Corruption in Russia since 1990 
 
Corruption in Russia is nothing new to Russia, it is a direct legacy from the Soviet 
Era, decades of bureaucratic control and underground economy. During communism the 
government interfered in all aspects of life, and bureaucrats were at the center role. They 
would demand payment for everything they did. There were no standard rules, the rules 
varied from one official to the next. Mafia had been operating in the Soviet Union since 
the 1960s, so that was nothing new either. During Soviet rule a parallel informal structure 
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grew up alongside the official party structure in which people engaged in illegal trade, 
exchanged favors. It is known that during the Soviet era there were underground firms 
operating under the cover of state owned enterprises, since at least 1952. All large-scale 
Russian criminal operations are mostly based on former connections. When communism 
collapsed, certainly the Russian way of thinking did not collapse. Moreover, the 
economic and political reforms of 1990s that were supposed to cure Russia from 
corruption worked just the opposite way. 
The whole phenomenon of corruption in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union could be interpreted by means of “demand or no demand for the rule of 
law”. Stiglitz and Hoff bring this question in their study “After the Big Bang” (Columbia 
University Discussion Paper, 2002). Rule of law is defined as well defined and enforced 
property rights; and no rule of law means a legal regime that does not protect investors’ 
returns from arbitrary confiscation, and that does not enforce contract rights.  
The following year after the USSR collapsed in December 1991, the so-called 
“Big Bang Reforms” were implemented which involved mass privatization of state 
enterprises. 
1995-97: Second wave of privatizations (metals, oil, utilities) occurred through a 
program called “loans for shares”. The main actors behind this scheme were not red 
directors (former Party officials), but some new bankers. (Vladimir Potanin of 
Oneximbank, Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Menatep..etc.) 
In their static model of the demand for the rule of law, Stiglitz and Hoff treat a 
variable that was previously treated as exogenous as endogenous-the political 
environment (the rule of law). They describe a coordination game in which the agents 
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either build up value or strip assets; and majority of agents are strictly better off 
building value under rule of law than stripping assets. The optimistic view behind the 
rapid privatizations that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union was that 
privatization would create a class of individuals who stood to gain enormously by 
building up the value of their firms and thus demand the rule of law. 
 
p.14 “Those who have an advantage in asset-stripping relative to wealth creation 
may also have an advantage in converting corporate and social assets to private 
use, and accordingly will not support the rule of law even when they themselves 
have assets to protect.” 
 
Thus, building value may be rational, and stripping assets may be rational, too. 
A popular view regarding the corruption and crime environment in the post-
Soviet Russia is that Russia today is experiencing an earlier stage of capitalism. The 
questions that have provoked more careful research are:  
 
-“Is the lack of rule of law, and the prevailing corrupt environment in post-Soviet 
Russia somewhat like US in the mid 1800s?”  
-“Can the newly emerged business elite (oligarchs/mafia) in post-communist era 
be compared to the robber barons of 1800s in the US?” 
 
This way of thinking is somewhat optimistic, because it implies that as Russia 
progresses in its route to capitalism, the rule of law will automatically be established, and 
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lawlessness and corruption will vanish.  Unfortunately, Annelise Anderson (1995), in her 
paper “The Red Mafia: A Legacy of Communism” (In Lazear, Edward P., ed. Economic 
Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform. Stanford, Calif: The 
Hoover Institution Press, 1995) shows that it is not very likely that time will naturally 
solve the problem of corruption in Russia. She argues that there is little similarity to 19th 
century US, because US was characterized by a respect for the rule of law since its 
formation and even before. Anderson points to the differences in the mafia phenomenon 
in Russia and in the early United States: there was no “gangs as primitive states” in the 
early US; in contrast, the mafias in Russia, fraud, violence, have arisen from the legacy of 
the communist era: excessive bureaucratic regulation, massive illegal markets. The 
government officials themselves are the beneficiaries of the underworld, which was very 
different from the case of the early US. 
 
Corruption Surveys 
 
A different dimension of the corruption phenomenon in Russia is the one that 
takes place in the daily life. A very interesting survey done by INDEM (Information 
Science for Democracy) involves personal interviews with several business leaders in 
Russia in late 1999-early 2000, to investigate the nature and the extent of corruption. 
(INDEM was founded in October 1997, and its purpose is to promote the emergence and 
development of democratic institutions in Russia.) 
According to the study “Diagnosing Corruption in Russia: A Sociological 
Analysis” (Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 46, no.1, January-February 2005. pp 19-
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36) the top seven corrupt departments are export licenses and quotas, budget transfers, 
tax offsets, servicing of budget accounts, barter and in kind debt payments, privatization, 
taxes and customs fees, and the banking sphere. They reported that the subsidized regions 
have the highest level of corruption, whereas the scale of corruption deals is bigger in the 
wealthy regions, especially those regions where export component is greater.  
Corruption creates a direct (financial) loss and indirect loss. The direct loss, in the 
form of exporting the capital by corrupt means is estimated $20 to $25 billion per year. 
Losses due to flaws in the tax system add up to about 25 percent of the GDP, and bribe 
payments to the government officials are estimated to add up to 10% of the value of the 
deal. The indirect losses relate to the destruction of the state apparatus and law 
enforcement system, which in turn brings obstacles to the normal functioning of market 
economy, and economic growth. Corruption makes investment risky, and adds extra 
uncertainty to the financial environment. The social effects can be listed as the 
deteriorating of the daily lives of the citizens, widening of income gap, and emergence of 
social tension. Another indirect loss is in the form of political costs. The lack of trust 
makes political life unstable, and this poses a threat to democracy. 
The INDEM interviews have defined and summarized the situations of interaction 
between citizens and government authorities where there is a risk of getting into a corrupt 
deal. According to their study, corruption is seen most in the dealings with traffic police, 
where 59.3% of all interactions involve corruption. Enrolling in a higher education 
institution, and transferring to another institution involves corrupt means 36% of the 
time; solving a problem related to military service: 32.6%; obtaining legal right to 
housing:28.9%; getting an operation or treatment in hospital:25.8%; registration/passport 
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or permission to get weapons: 19.7%; acquiring a plot of land: 14.9%; obtaining free 
medical help in a polyclinic: 22.2% 
In the similar spirit, another very interesting study to mention is the one called “ 
‘Foolish to Give and Yet More Foolish Not to Take’. In-Depth Interviews with Post-
Communist Citizens on Their Everyday Use of Bribes and Contacts” by Ase B. 
Grodeland, Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, and William L. Miller. (Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
50, No. 4, Jun 1998, pp 651-677) 
 
Mafia/ Oligarchs 
 
The two main power groups that dominate the Russian business and political 
decision-making are the clans and the oligarchs. The former Soviet elite, nomenklatura, 
have benefited for years from the privatizations of the state assets and the reforms under 
Gorbachev. They used these advantages to get rich very fast. Today the clans operate on 
all levels of the Russian society.  
Besides the clans there are a number of powerful men, called oligarchs. The 
‘loans for share’ program gave rise to the term “oligarchs” to refer to the small group of 
bankers and industrialists who received billions of state assets in exchange for help in re-
electing President Yeltsin. After 1998 the term ‘oligarch’ was generally adopted and soon 
gained an equivalent meaning to the popular term “Mafia”. They have power in financial 
areas such as banks; in media, such as television companies, newspapers and publishing 
houses; in industrial areas such as oil, gas and metals. They also have political 
connections with the leaders of the country. They can finance election campaigns and in 
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return they can get some benefits like licenses for their commercial activities, or access to 
communication and energy by privatization. 
The might of oligarchs surely has an exaggeration in it, but nevertheless it has 
some truth. By the end of 1980s a business class emerged in Russia, which were 
notorious for their close ties with the government; even to the point of influencing the 
politicians. The idea of the self-image of Russian tycoons as ‘politicians’ (or as 
‘designers of politics’) is expressed in the work by Hans-Henning Schroder, and Claudia 
Bell “El’tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Groups in Russian Politics 
between 1993 and July 1998”. [Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 6 (Sep., 1999), 957-
988]   
There is now a widely held agreement that the Russian Mafia is a continuance of 
the informal economy and related corruption that was a significant part of the economy of 
the Soviet Union. The paper by Annelise Anderson (1995) presents a deeper discussion 
of Russian mafia. There are certain characteristics that should be met by a group to be 
called ‘mafia’. A gang that robs banks is not a mafia, although organized, Anderson 
states.  
The crucial distinction between an ordinary robber gang and mafia lies in the ability 
of mafia to perform governmental functions, law enforcement and criminal justice (in 
spheres where legal judicial system refuses to exercise power/ or unable to do so.) 
Another characteristic of mafia is: their influence in the legal law enforcement. (bribing 
the police, courts…etc). She writes down the 3 historical conditions that lead to the 
development of mafias, as an answer to the general question “Why do mafias develop?” 
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1. Abdication of legitimate government power. (Possibly encouraged by 
population’s rejection of governmental authority) e.g. Sicily 
2. Excessive bureaucratic power. 
3. Financial potential of illegal markets. (In US prohibition years: alcohol) 
2 and 3 were characteristic of Soviet Union before break-up. Shortages of consumer 
goods provided the opportunity for additional income. 
Russian mafia has been considered as different from the classic mafias of US and 
Italy, in that the execution of violence was not done by the underworld leaders, but by 
those in positions of government. The government officials themselves competed for the 
monopoly rents, not the underground operators. Usually the government took no step 
toward the punishment of the criminal activities of a local mafia upon the complaints by 
the citizens. Since mafia and the government were almost indistinguishable from each 
other, exposure of their crimes often brought about a chance for the mafia to attack on 
those who have complained. “Government knows exactly who is dealing with what. 
Arrests are made only when there is larger political reason.”(O’Hearn 1980, 219) 
Authorities saw no need to provide cooperatives with protection (mid 80s when they 
were permitted) As one former police officer said “…we were all taught to regard 
private property as somehow illegitimate. Police stayed away. When these cooperatives 
were threatened by black-marketeers, they had no choice but to go along.” (Handelman 
1993, 30) 
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How did the oligarchs get rich? 
From several studies done by Anders Aslund, the director of the Russian and 
Eurasian Program in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, it can be deduced 
that there were 3 major ways that the entrepreneurs in the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union made their fortune, and came to be called the “oligarchs”,  
The first way was selling/or trading raw materials (including oil) at below market 
prices. The raw materials were then sold in the West at market prices, and the individuals 
pocketed the difference.  
In the spring of 1992 the state price of oil was 1 percent of the world 
market price; the domestic prices of other commodities were about 10 
percent of world prices. Managers of state companies bought oil, metals, 
and other commodities from the state enterprises they controlled on their 
private accounts, acquired export licenses and quotas from corrupt 
officials, arranged political protection for themselves, and then sold the 
commodities abroad at world prices. Their gains can be calculated easily 
by multiplying the average price differential by the volume of commodities 
exported and deducting export taxes. The total export rents were no less 
than $24 billion in the peak year of 1992, or 30 percent of GDP, since the 
exchange rate was very low that year. The resulting private revenues were 
accumulated abroad, which led to massive capital flight. (Anders Aslund 
with Martha Brill Olcott, eds., Russia after Communism, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1999; with Martha 
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Brill Olcott, "Introduction", pp. xv-xxiii; with Mikhail Dmitriev, 
"Economic Reform versus Rent Seeking, pp. 91-130.) 
Secondly, borrowing money from the Central Bank of Russia constituted a 
means to get rich for many bankers. The Central Bank gave credits as a favor to 
well-connected businessmen, which amounted to 32% of the GDP in 1992. 
(Aslund, 1999) The bankers’ argument, on the other hand, was that the credits 
were “Keynesian”, that is, it would help the demand and supply of industrial 
production to expand.  
The third way of making an enormous fortune in the transition period was 
taking advantage of the import subsidies for food from Western humanitarian 
organizations that are designed to help alleviate the ongoing threat of famine 
across Russia. (1991-1992) The subsidies allowed the importer to pay only 1% of 
the current exchange rate when he purchased essential food items. After importing 
them, the importer sold the foods relatively freely on the domestic market and 
pocketed the subsidy for herself.  
III. Literature 
 
Theory of Rent Seeking  
 
Economists have studied rent seeking for decades. The brief definition of rent seeking 
is the procedure of spending resources by individuals or groups in order to obtain benefits 
in the form of monetary or political gains. In the literature so far, there are three broad 
categories of viewing “rent seeking”. (Hartle, 1983) 
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The first point of view emphasizes the loss of resources when parties compete with 
each other during the rent seeking process. Bhagwati (1982) can be cited as an example, 
as he invented the term DUP (Directly Unproductive) Activities to describe rent seeking.  
Secondly, rent seeking can be seen as the relationships between government and 
interest groups, government being another rationally self-interested agent. The seminal 
work of Stigler (1971) “The Theory of Economic Regulation” explains that regulation is 
beneficial to the industries; therefore industries seek to receive governmental regulations. 
It is the first paper to picture the government as a utility maximizing body. His main 
point is “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit” (Stigler, 1971). He is the first author who talks about demand 
and supply of government regulation, therefore pioneered the study of the field called 
(after his 1971 paper) “economic theory of regulation”. Stigler listed four main policies, 
which an industry (or occupation) that has enough power will seek of the government.  
• Direct subsidy. 
• Control over entry by new rivals. 
• Policies that affect the substitute or complement industries. 
• Policies that involve price controls by law. 
Along this line, some other influential works can be mentioned, too: Mancur Olson 
(1965) in his “The Logic of Collective Action” portrays the government and interest 
groups similarly, by expressing the ways in which interest groups organize efficiently in 
order to get the desired regulation from government. Peltzman (1976) “Toward a More 
General Theory of Regulation” generalizes Stigler’s point, and shows regulation as an 
outcome of the competition between interest groups. Many economists later on adopted 
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the idea of competition between interest groups. (e.g. Becker (1983) “A Theory of 
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”) 
The third way of viewing rent seeking is as a game between rational, utility 
maximizing agents. The use of game theory in explaining economic and social, and 
institutional changes is gaining increasing emphasis in the literature. Among the 
significant works, Acemoglu- Robinson (1999, 2000); Vishny- Shleifer (1994) 
“Politicians and Firms” can be mentioned. 
 
Literature on Corruption 
 
In the literature a very common approach to analyze corruption has been through 
incorporating rent seeking into the models of endogenous growth. Ehrlich and Lui 
(1999), and Barreto (2000) can be cited as the most formal studies of corruption, which 
are done in endogenous growth context.  
Barreto (2000) uses Barro’s (1990) growth model. Barreto models the 
government as a monopoly supplier of a public good. The government agents take illegal 
advantage of their position by extracting rents, but are constrained by the possibility of 
being caught in the act of corruption and punished. The underlying assumption is 
common with Stigler (1971), which is “self seeking government”.  Barreto states that the 
existence of the monopoly position of the public sector generates lower growth rates and 
sub-optimal levels of income. 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999), in their endogenous growth model, where the investment 
in human capital is the engine of growth, show the corruption as the inevitable aspect of 
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government intervention in economy. They define another type of capital, which they call 
“political capital” which has no beneficial effects on productive capacity; as opposed to 
human capital, which generates growth. Their interpretation of the rent-seeking activities 
as “investment in political capital” brilliantly introduces corruption into the formal 
endogenous growth model. Balanced growth, in their model, means the balancing of the 
accumulation of human capital and political capital. They analyze the cases of 
homogenous agents versus heterogeneous agents who have different endowments and 
investment strategies. The homogenous agents each of whom is both worker and 
bureaucrat have two choices of actions: investing in either Human Capital (which is 
productive) or in Political Capital (which is not productive-hence called rent-seeking). It 
is a multiple equilibrium model, which brings about 3 equilibria: Low-level stagnant 
equilibrium (poverty trap); Stagnant “development” equilibrium (unstable); and 
Persistent “growth” equilibrium. Investment in political capital is found to be highest in 
Low-level stagnant equilibrium, and moderate in stagnant “development” equilibrium, 
and lowest in persistent “growth” equilibrium. Investment in human capital is ranked just 
the reverse. (Highest in the persistent “growth” equilibrium, etc.) This finding supports 
the idea that corruption is high in less developed countries and low in more developed 
countries. Next issue that is addressed in Ehrlich Lui (1999) paper is the role of 
government intervention. Some exogenous changes in the government size are given and 
the results are analyzed. Increased government intervention is found to be lowering the 
short run level and long run rate of growth of per capita income in the “growth” 
equilibrium; and lowering the level of per capita income in the stagnant equilibrium. 
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Vito Tanzi studies the link between public investment and corruption (Tanzi, 
1997) and finds a positive relationship among them. The connection between trade, 
openness, and rent seeking has an important share in the trade literature. Starting with 
Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati (1982), many economists have argued that barriers to trade 
increase rent seeking. Grossman and Helpman (1994) look at the lobbying aspect of 
interest groups when it comes to the choice of trade policies.  
A recent paper by Mohtadi, Roe and Polasky (2004) is using the Krueger idea of 
openness to trade and a model that is borrowed from Romer; and presenting the signaling 
game between agents. The existence of the protected intermediate sector creates 
monopoly rents, hence possibility of corruption, in a somewhat similar fashion to Barreto 
(2000) where monopoly rents represent corruption, and result in slower growth and sub-
optimal levels of income; and also in that the agents are limited in their pursuits of 
capturing all the rent through the risk of getting caught and the punishment. 
Dynamic models, among which Dixit, Grossman, and Gul (2000); Ellis and 
Fender (2003) can be mentioned, capture the time element and the temporality of the 
government positions. The main idea is that the individuals who are in power today 
decide on the distributional and ideological issues, but once others replace them, the 
newcomers reverse what has been done so far, according to their own interests. But there 
can be mutual benefit from intertemporal smoothing. Each ruling party is willing to 
compromise if it could trust the other. A dynamic game is introduced and studied. 
“Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model” by Christopher J. Ellis and 
John Fender (2003) is another paper where, and corruption is an inevitable part of the 
economy. Their claim is that there exists an “irreducible” level of endogenously 
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determined corruption, which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. 
Ellis and Fender use dynamic optimization techniques in a Ramsey type model of 
economic growth, in which public capital is the engine of growth. Public capital is a 
public good that is financed by taxes on private output. Government can do two things 
with the taxes it collects: It can either use the taxes to fund public capital (hence 
contribute to economic growth) or consume the taxes, which in other words can be called 
as “corruption”. Governments choose the time path for public capital investment. The 
model’s steady state and dynamical behavior along the saddle path are the main subjects 
of their paper. 
An alternative (perhaps, rather than alternative, we should call it “pure”) way of 
viewing corruption is through addressing the role of government and the room for 
corruption during the process of correcting the market failures. Therefore, corruption, as 
different from being inherent in the economy through a totally self-interested government 
or monopoly rents, may come from the abuse of positions by the government officials for 
private benefit Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). 
According to Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) government intervention, which 
originates from market failures, transfers resources from one party to another. This 
creates incentives for corrupt behavior. Government tries to correct the market failures, 
but the moment it steps into the economy, some degree of corruption is certainly 
introduced. This is referred to as the “unavoidable price of dealing with market failures”. 
Government intervention has two instruments: the number of bureaucrats and their 
wages. When there is a large number of bureaucrats, there is a small punishment for 
being caught in the action of taking bribes (corruption), the amount of corruption is less. 
 19
But on the other hand when the number of bureaucrats are little, there is more room for 
corrupt behavior, and there is greater punishment accordingly. 
The concept of shadow economy has links to rent seeking and corruption. 
Ekaterina Vostroknutova, and Acemoglu model the rent seeking as coexisting with 
production in an economy where the agents try to allocate their resources between 
productive and unproductive activities depending on their payoffs. Corruption is seen as 
an unproductive activity. In Vostroknutova (2003) the producer is able to hide part of his 
output from bribery and taxation; and that constitutes a “shadow economy”. The presence 
of a shadow sector has different implications for different countries, depending on their 
level of rent seeking. Vostroknutova gives a special emphasis to the former socialist 
economies, because the kinds of problems that arise with corruption are most evidently 
seen in those countries. The common problems of those economies are mainly associated 
with transition to a market economy: lack of established property rights, legacy of rent 
seeking, lack of applying the rule of law, hence the strengthening of mafia and finally 
corruption. Multiple equilibria arise. In the end the introduction of a shadow sector 
eliminates the “bad” equilibrium, and makes the system converge to a path with low level 
of rent seeking. Policies to reduce the size of the shadow economy are shown to vary in 
their impacts, which depend on the level of corruption. For low corruption levels, these 
policies work better, but for corrupt economies the result is a decrease in the production 
levels and increase in corruption. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) focus on principal agent model of corruption, where 
the principal is the top level of government; and the agent is an official who takes bribe 
from individuals who are interested in government produced good, in exchange for illegal 
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action. But political competition opens up the government, increases transparency, and 
therefore reduces corruption. In their model government-produced good can be passport/ 
or import license; and the officer might commit corruption in two alternative ways: with 
theft or without theft. 
1. With theft: Government official takes money in exchange for reducing the 
payments, such as taxes or tariffs, which the briber owes to the government. 
2. Without theft: Government official takes additional money in exchange for giving 
the briber the goods such as permits, to which he is entitled without the bribe. 
Corruption without theft raises costs; corruption with theft reduces costs (spreads 
with competition). Their two broad reasons why corruption may be costly to economic 
development: The first reason is that corruption implies a weak central government, 
which makes it easier for government officials of various ranks to impose independent 
bribes on individuals. That in turn makes investment very difficult. For example, if a 
foreigner wanted to invest in Russia, he had to bribe every agent. The second reason is 
that corruption distorts the country’s investment from health and education to “potentially 
useless projects” (like defense or infrastructure) if the agents find better opportunities for 
receiving bribes. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also describe a model of bargaining between politicians and 
managers, which enables us to analyze political influence on firms. The model is a 3-
player game between the public, the politicians and the enterprise managers, with an 
emphasis on the role of transfers between the public and the private sectors, including 
subsidies to enterprises and bribes to politicians. The exciting part about their model is 
that rather than distinguishing sharply between public vs. private firms, they assume that 
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a fraction α of firm’s cash flow is owned by manager, and (1-α) owned by Treasury. (For 
a private firm, α is close to 1, for a public firm α is close to 0) α as continuous variable,  
In the game proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) the politician derives some political 
benefit from the extra employment, therefore wants the firm to employ some extra labor, 
L. To persuade the manager to hire L, politician can subsidize the firm (transfer the 
amount t from Treasury to the firm). Their main points are that privatization of cash 
flows encourages restructuring when the government is limited in subsidizing profitable 
firms with rich private shareholders. (implies that potentially profitable firms are best 
candidates for privatization); and privatization is more likely to be implemented when the 
reformers want to restrict government spending and cannot obtain large political benefits 
from public firms. 
 
IV. The Model 
 
Keeping in the background the Russian oil companies story, in this model there are 2 
identical oil-producing firms: one owned by the state, and the other private (owned by the 
so-called ‘oligarch’). The revenue of the state firm directly goes to the government’s 
budget, and the government controls its actions; therefore it can be considered as 
indistinguishable from the “government”. The revenue of the state firm is referred to as 
“government’s revenue” for simplicity. The output, X, (oil) is produced according to 
identical production functions by the two firms.  
The study by Hamid Mohtadi, Stephen Polasky, and Terry Roe (December 2004, 
AEA Conference) adopts a signaling game approach to study the role of trade in an 
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economy. In their model there is a domestic competitive final goods sector (Y) and a 
protected, monopolistic intermediate goods sector (X), which can be called a trade sector. 
The trade sector receives protection from the government and thus generates monopoly 
rents. Such rents are thought to be the source of corruption. If government opens this 
sector to trade, then monopoly privileges disappear, and thus there will be no more 
corruption possibilities arising from being monopoly. But the trade sector offers some 
portion of these monopoly rents as bribe to the government, in exchange for 
government’s protection. Government in turn, can be of two types: honest or corrupt. 
In this paper, however, government is itself a player, and there’s no doubt that 
government is interested in corruption (i.e. a self-interested agent, which tries to 
maximize its utility by weighing the costs and returns of different actions, whether be 
called ‘corrupt’ or not.) 
In the transition economy, since the government can still exercise a substantial 
degree of arbitrary decision making, we are assuming that the government can decide to 
let the private firm operate, or not. On the other hand, the new market economy needs 
loans from the international organizations in order to undertake investments. The 
international institutions give the loans on the basis of the country’s credibility; i.e. not 
being corrupt, following the principles of free market economy, privatizing a reasonable 
amount of state owned facilities…etc. In making the decision of letting or not letting the 
private firm to operate, the government is calculating the emergence of a potential “rival” 
versus the risk of losing its ‘credibility’ in the international community. 
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The Government (The State Firm) 
Government has two choices of actions:  
-Letting the private firm operate (L for “Let”), or 
-Not letting it operate (D, for “Don’t Let”), by accusing it of being corrupt. 
Government can allow a private oil company to exist, provided that the firm 
supplies him with an adequate amount of bribe. In this case, there is a risk of being 
caught while taking bribe and being punished. The punishment is in the form of a huge 
political scandal, also resulting in the loss of the loans that are being received by the 
country from the international economic organizations.  
But, shutting down the private firm is also as difficult. In this case the government 
starts a campaign to “fight against corruption”, and accuses the firm of being corrupt. By 
using the “fight against corruption” argument, the government hopes to legitimize its 
confiscation of the private firm, without being viewed by the international community as 
“violating the market economy principles”. Nevertheless, there is no certainty regarding 
this outcome. There is always a risk of a cut of loans, and a punishment for abusing the 
state power and arbitrarily seizing a private property. 
 
The Oligarch (The Private Firm) 
The oligarch on the other hand, can be of two types, which are unknown to the 
government:  
-Strong (S) or  
-Weak (W) (The type is unknown to the government)  
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The Strong Type of oligarch, in the case of any injustice done against itself by the 
government, can consult international judicial bodies, and make the case known widely. 
This would result in the punishment of the government and the consequent loss of the 
loans. The Weak Type of oligarch, in contrast, cannot complain to the international 
courts. (It either lacks the financial means, or skills, or both, to do so) Therefore upon 
confiscating the weak firm, the government still keeps being “credible” and at the same 
time enjoys the doubling of its revenues. 
 
One Period Game, Passive Oligarch 
 
In the trivial one period setting the government is the only actor who responds to 
the amount of bribe that is offered by the oligarch; and the oligarch is passive since she 
cannot act after the government makes the decision. Simply, the game ends. In that case, 
what makes the government decide to “let” or “not to let” the private firm to operate is 
the amount of bribe that is offered. 
The utility function of the government is: 
GU kX b Cα β δ γ= + + Λ − − Μ  
where  
X: the amount of output produced by a firm 
k captures the decision of government to allow or not to allow the private firm to 
operate. 
  
1 ,
2 ,
if the government allows the private firm to operate
k
otherwise
⎧= ⎨⎩
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b: the amount of bribe the government collects from the private firm in exchange 
for granting her the right to operate. 
1 ,
0 ,
if the government allows the private firm to operate
otherwise
α ⎧= ⎨⎩  
Λ : the loan that the government receives from international economic 
organizations to help ease the burden of transition. 
1 ,
0 1 ,
if the oligarch is strong type
if the oligarch is weak type
β β
⎧= ⎨ < <⎩  
C: the punishment to the government for getting caught while engaging in 
corruption (taking bribe from the private firm). 
0 1,
0 ,
if government allows the private firm to operate
otherwise
δδ < <⎧= ⎨⎩  
 
M: the punishment to the government for anti-democratic behavior in the case of 
not allowing private firms to operate. 
0 ,
0 1 ,
if the government allows the private firm to operate
otherwise
γ γ
⎧= ⎨ < <⎩  
 
Therefore the payoffs of the government conditional on the different types of oligarch 
could be summarized as 
, :
, :
' , : 2
' , : 2
Let S X b C
Let W X b C
Don t let S X M
Don t let W X M
β δ
δ
β γ
γ
+ + Λ −
+ + Λ −
+ Λ −
+ Λ −
 
Therefore, when faced with the strong type, the government chooses to “Let” if : 
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b C X M
b X C M
δ γ
δ γ
− ≥ −
≥ + −  
.And when faced with the weak type, the government chooses to “Let” if: 
b X C Mδ γ≥ + −  
Thus, the government allows the private firm to operate provided that a threshold level of 
bribe, b*, is met. 
 
The Signaling Game 
 
 This model is highly inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). 
Nature chooses the type of the oligarch from the set { },T S W= ,with the 
probabilities Sp for strong type (S) and Wp for the weak type (W). 
1 , ,tp where t S W= =∑  The government does not know the types. 
The informed party (the oligarch) moves first, and offers a bribe amount, thus 
signals its type. Government, upon observing the bribe amount, decides to take one of the 
following actions from the action set { },A L D= (To let him operate, L, or do not let, D). 
The posterior beliefs of the government regarding the type (t) of the oligarch, as a 
function of the bribe is  with ( )t bπ ( ) 1t bπ =∑ for all levels of bribe.  
After observing the actions of the government, L or D, the oligarch decides to 
fight back or not. She chooses one of the actions from her action set F = {F, DF}. 
Fighting back means carrying the case to the international courts, and blaming the 
government of being unlawful, either because of taking bribe (if government chooses L), 
or because of acting in an antidemocratic fashion (if government chooses D). 
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If the oligarch fights back, the payoff that the government gets depends on the 
type of the oligarch (S or W). 
If the strong type (S) decides to fight back, she always wins without cost. Fighting 
back is costly for the weak type (W), by a lump-sum amount of LΓ , if the government 
chooses L, or with the cost of DΓ , if the government chooses D. ( L DΓ < Γ  assuming that 
the lawsuit will not be as big in the case of government action L, as compared to the case 
of the government action D) 
 In the case of fighting back, the government nevertheless loses some credibility, 
i.e. the very fact that a lawsuit has been pursued against the government casts some 
suspicion and distaste, therefore the international organizations cut the loans. ( ) 0Λ =
The punishment against corruption is more likely to be realized if the oligarch is a 
strong type (The probability of detection of the bribe is higher: S Wδ δ> ), in the case of 
Fighting back; whereas it doesn’t matter in the case of No Fighting back. δ is then the 
same across types. 
If the oligarch doesn’t fight back in the next step after observing the government’s 
action L, or D, then simply the amount of bribe determines the fate of the oligarch. In 
order not to end up with zero (action D) the oligarch offers a high enough bribe and 
receive the payoff of X b− ,  
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 Summary  
The sequence of the events could be summarized as follows:  
• Nature chooses the type of oligarch from T = {S, W} (Type not observed by the 
government).  
• Oligarch offers bribe, b.  
• Government observes the bribe, and updates her belief regarding the type. 
Government chooses the action ‘Let’ or ‘Do not Let’, from A ={L, D} 
• Oligarch chooses to “Fight back” or “Do not Fight back” from the set F = {F, DF} 
• Payoffs are realized. 
  F 
 L 
 DF 
 S  F 
 D 
 DF 
    F 
  L 
 W  DF 
  
 F 
 D 
 
 
  DF 
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Table 1 shows the payoffs to the government and the oligarch in the upper and the lower 
rows, respectively.  
 
 
 Oligarch fights back Oligarch doesn’t fight back 
 S W S W 
Let ( )[ ] (1 ( ))[ ]S S S WX b b C bπ δ π δ+ + − + − − C  X b Cβ δ+ + Λ −  
 X b−  LX b− − Γ  X b−  X b−  
Don’t let ( )[ ] (1 ( ))[2 ]S Sb X M b X Mπ π γ− + − −  2X Mβ γ+ Λ −  2X Mγ+ Λ −  
 X  D−Γ  0 0 
Table 1 
 
 
, , ( )[ ]
, ,
, , (1 ( ))[ ]
, ,
, , , ( )[ ]
, , 2
, , (1 ( ))[2 ]
, , 2
S S
S W
S
S
L S F X b b C
L S DF X b C
L W F X b b C
L W DF X b C
D S F b X M
D S DF X M
D W F b X M
D W DF X M
π δ
β δ
π δ
β δ
π
β γ
π γ
γ
+ + −
+ + Λ −
+ + − −
+ + Λ −
−
+ Λ −
− −
+ Λ −
 
 
 
The government is clearly better off in the case that the oligarchs do not fight 
back, regardless of the type of the oligarch, S or W. 
The aim of the paper is to show the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. 
Having introduced the fact that the bribe can be used as a signal by the oligarch to 
distinguish herself from the other types, we will attempt to model the cases of identical 
and different bribe amounts, therefore the pooling and separating equilibria. 
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Conclusion 
The transition economies have been characterized by high levels of corruption. 
Therefore, the first step in attempting a solution to the problems faced by the post Soviet 
type of economies is to understand the phenomenon of corruption. There has developed a 
vast amount of literature on the subject matter, and one aim of this paper is to review and 
organize that literature.  
In this paper corruption is viewed no differently than maximizing one’s own 
welfare, and the key to solving corruption is through removing the incentives that lead to 
corrupt acts. The governments in the transition economies, however, are of special 
interest; since they can exercise arbitrary actions of shutting down private firms, violate 
the rule of law, etc., at a very little or no cost, contrary to the governments in the 
developed market economies. 
The example of the current tension between the Russian government and 
oligarchs sets forth a different dimension to the corruption phenomenon. The 
authoritarian-inclined governments of the transition economies can use the weapon of 
“fight against corruption” to masquerade their intentions of restoring their state 
monopolies by taking over the private firms. 
The model presented in this paper is just a proposal, and will be developed to 
offer meaningful propositions, which could shed light to the game that has implicitly 
been played between the Russian government and the oligarchs. This might contribute to 
the ongoing efforts to analyze and solve the problems faced by all of the transition 
economies. 
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